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7. Myrthe

~b~/the

wife of a wealthy financier, Malcolm Morabund, consults you
and tells you that she and her husband have been happily married for some years. She
also tells you that recently he became quite ill mentally, and finally had to be
committed to Western State Hospital, at Staunton. She shows you medical reports which
make it clear that her husband will never become sane enough to be released from the
Hospital. She inquires of you whether she is entitled to(a)a divorce f rom her husband; and(b)support from his estate .
What would you advise her?
(DOMESTIC RELATIONS)(a)Sickness, mental or otherwise, i 0 not a ground of divorce in
Virginia as there is no absolute divorce at common l aw for any cause, and it is not
one of the grounds for divorce under V#20-9l or any other statute.(b)Sickness of the
husband does not excuse him from supporting hi s family if he has the means to do so.
In the instant case it is the duty of the husband's committee to provide for his
family from his estate if that i s ample. See V#37-150 and 37-152.
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10. Hamst~g,~when he wa~ les s than a month old, was left on the doorstep of Mother
Goose. Mother Goose nursed and cared for Hamstrung for s evera l months. Shortly before
her death, which occurred when Hams trung was eleven months old, Mother Goose gave
the baby to Sly Dog and Coy Dog, his wife, who agreed, in writing, that they would
adopt Hamstrung and that they would provide for and treat him in all respects as
their own child. Mr. and .!"Irs. Dog r aised Hamstrung t o manhood, gave him an educati on
called him their son and he spoke of them as his father and mother. On many occasion~
both Sly Dog and Coy Dog informed their friends and relatives that they had adopted
Hamstrung. Sly Dog died, testate, Dec.l2,1948, leavi ng all of his estate to his wife
Coy D.og. Within a few months thereafter, Coy Dog died, intestat e , survived by
'
Hamstrung and five first cousins. No court proc eedings were ever initiated for the
adoption of Hamstrung. Hamstr ung and the five f i r st cousins of Coy Dog claim her
estate. Hamstrung consults you . What rights , if any, does Hamstrung have in the
o-.t.l:lt.A?

i -. ~'.

(DO~E3TIC RELATIONS• -WILIB--INTESTATE SUCC ESSI ON) Hamstrung has no rights . T~,f~
r:erl t as an adopted child one must qe leg.fllY adc;>pted. See ~85 Va.B2 on p.l209 of

I:omest i c Relations in these Notes.
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3 ~\~ November, 1955, Mrs. Laura Brown filed a bill inequity against Fred Brown,her
husband, praying that she be granted support and maintenarx:e and attorneys fees, but
not asking for a divorce. Laura Brown alleged that her husband had deserted and
abandoned her after becoming infatuated with another woman; that all marital rela.. ·_ . _
tions had been severed by him without justification; that he possessed considerable
property consisting of real estate of the value of more than $200,000, as well as
valuable personal property; that he was amply able to supply her with adequate maintenance; arxi that she was without funds to provide for her support or to pay court
cos ts and counsel fe es. Both Mr. and Mrs. Brown are residents of Henry County,Va.,
and the bill in equity was filed in 1he Henry County Circuit Court.
Fred Brown, by his attorney, demurred to the bill on the ground that equity had no
jurisdiction to entertain a bill for support and maintenance alone, and that unless
a divorce was asked for , the bi l l in equity should be dismiss ed. How should the
Court rule on this demurrer?
(DOMESTIC RELATIONS) The demurrer should be overruled. The wife has no adequate
remedy at law and is entitled t.o1 suppo::_t. See 177 ~;·J~n /f.:~~~~he..J?om~~c
Relati ons cases 1n1hese notes.;t/: ~,/.J-<_,o./ p- .1'
-

--

2. In a~rop~1Virginia proceeding for determining the right to custody of children,
Kirsten Flagg petitioned the Court for custody of her child, Gretchen. She alleged
as follows: Her husband, Floyd Flagg, a native of Richmond, had met and courted her

when he was stationed in the Army near her home in Wisconsin, that they were
married in Wisconsin, and in due time she gave birth to the child, Gretchen, after
which Floyd was discharged from the Army and the parties moved to Richmond. Soon
thereafter and before Floyd could find a job to support his family, he became ill
from a malady which crippled him and was predicted to be of a permanent nature. He
and Kirsten then agreed that the child Gretchen would be lodged with Floyd's parent,::
in Richmond indefinitely and that Kirsten would seek employment in Fredericksburg.
Now, ten years later when Gretchen is aged twelve, Kirsten Flagg has become
financially independent and seeks to be awarded custody of the child, contending
that as the mother of the female infant a presumption is raised by law in favor of
her having custody.
Floyd Flagg and his parents consult you and tell you that because of the discovery
of a new "wonder drug", Floyd has miraculously and fully recovered from his illness .•
but that neither he nor Kirsten desire to resume their marital relations, and that
he prefers the child to remain with his parents. These parties ask your advice as
to (l)whether the mother is presumptively entitled to custody of the child; (2)
whether the Court will enforce the agreement between the parents whereby they lodged
custody of the child with the parents of Floyd;(3)what obligation, if any, Floyd
will have to contribute to the child's support should Kirsten be awarded custody.
How would you advise them?
(DOMESTIC RELATIONS)(l) In a contest between parents by V#Jl-1.5 there is no presump··
tion of law in favor of either parent, but the welfare of the child is the primary
consideration. In a contest between a parent and a non-parent there is a presumptjon
that the parent is entitled to custody rather than a non-parent.(2) The custody of
children is not a matter of bargaining. Hence the court is ·at liberty to ignore the
agreement. Of course, if the agreement seems to be for the child's best interests
it could enter a decree as per the agreement. (3) Floyd remains under a duty to
support his child regardless of whether custody is given to the wife, or to his
designee for obvious reasons of public policy.
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8.Husband and Wife were married in 1956. Shortly thereafter, they began to quarrel
and Husband accused Wife of being a poor cook and of no t looking after the ho use
properly. Wife accused Husband of beine; mean and laz y, and of f ailing to support her.
One day during a heated argument. between them, Husband struck Trlife several times on
her legs wtth a riding -v;hip. Wife immediately left the home and sued Husband for a
divorce a mensa alleging that he wa.s an habitual drunkard, and failed to support her ,
and on tEe-one-occasion, had been guilty of cruelty toward her. Husband filed a
cross-bill asking an a mensa divorce, j_n which he charged Wife vlith being lazy,
quarrelsome, nagging and refusing to permit sexual intercour::;e. The only t estimony
in the suit was that of the partiP :.l themselves. Wife testifi ed as to the riding whip
occurrence and claimed that Husband was a drunkard and tl1at he had not supported her.
She arnni tted on cross-examination that she had l ocked her bedr oom door and refused
Husband access to the room. He in turn admi tted the riding wLip incident and claimed
Wife was lazy, quarrelsome and nagging .
How should the court rule?
(OOMES1'IC RELATIONS ) No divorce should be granted on the testimony of the husband
and wife alone. It is also arguable that the things stated, even i f true, do not
constitute cruelty, or any other grounds for a divorce.

•

5~~usband filed a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of Halifax County,Va.,
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praying that he be granted a divorce from the bonds of matrimony from Wife on the
ground of adultery. Husband also prayed that all real property jointly owned with
Wife be divided equally between them. Wife filed an answer and cross-bill in which
she prayed for a divorce from bed and board on the ground of desertion,and also
that the propert.y rights of the parties be settled in the suit •
A decree was entered granting ;Husband a divorce, a vinculo matrimonii, and directing that the real estate owned jointly by the parties be divided equally between
them. This real estate consisted of a house and lot, title to which haa been taken
in Husband and Wife as tenants by the entirety with right of survivorship. Wife had
inherited $10,000 from her. father's estate, $9,000 of which was used for the cash
payment on this property. Husband contributed only $500 toward the cash payment. It
further appeared that a deed of trust had been placed on the property for the principal sum of $5,500 for the residue of purchase n1oney, which amount had been curtailed by payments from the Wife's earnings alone in the amount of $1,500.
Wife claims that she is entitled to a greater interest than allowed h~r by the
decree.
Is her contention correct?
(DOMESTIC RELATIONS) No. Under the above facts there is no resulting trust in favor
of the wife. She made a gift to her husband and after that gift took effect he tvas
an equal co-owner. See 200 Va. 77 in the Domestic Relations Cases in these Notes.

:f/.,i
9 •. n December of 1959 Susan, who was possessed of substantial means, married Dan
St1tzer, a scion of a wealthy family who engaged in no gainful occ pat'
d h
spent ~he major portion of his tim~ at his racing stable and at fa~hio~~~le~es~ro
In Apr1l of 1961 Susan became susp1cious of Dan's fidelity and am 1 d th
ts.
of Private Eye Agency, which ~oon obtained -evidence clear~ confi~;e Sus:n~:rvioes
suspicions. Susan thereupo~ flled a suit against Dan seeking a divorc: on th
ground of adultery and ask1ng that alimony of $2,000 a month be awarded her eAft
Dan's answer was filed, the suit came on for a hearing ore tenus Susa b •
er
corroborated evidence, proved the adultery and proved s~would ~eed n~t Y du!K
1
$2,000 each month to maintain her normal and accustomed mode of living h~s~
an
had theretofore been paid her each month by Dan. Dan then testif' d d, w fltc sum
mi tting his d 1t
ff ed
le an ' a er ad.
a u ery, o er
evidence to prove that the imrestment income of Susan
resultlng from her own property was, ot itself, more than enough to provide her
j2 }000 each month. Counse~ for Su~an objected to this evidence on the groun~...l~f
J rrelevancy, which object1on the Court sustained and entered a decree granting Susan
an absolute divorce and requiring Dan to pay her $2 000 each month as alimony
To what extent, if any, did the Court err?
'
•
\DOMESTIC RELATIONS) The Court erred in granting alimony to the wife who has innepe~d~nt means of.her own which will enable her to live as she has been accustomed
t o l~v1ng. N~ publ1c policy is served by making it possible for a former wife who
has been rel~eved of all marital duties to live a life of luxuriant idleness at the
expense ~f her.former ~usband even though he was the guilty party in the divorce
case •. Al1mony 1s not g1ven to punish the husband. See 199 Va.)88 in the Domestic
Relat1ons Cases of these notes.
6PYohn and Mary met and married i n New York where; both were working. John r s business took them to various places, but finally he was located permanently in Roanoke,
Va., on February 2,1962, and bought a home there where they, apparently, lived
happily until Nov.30,1962. On that day, Mary, returxling unexpectedly from a visit
to her parents in New York, found a strange woman o~cupying her bedroom. Mary at
once let-::, John and instituted a suit fo r divorce in ".:.he Law and Chancery Court of
Roanoke on the ground of adultery. John immediatnly consults you and tells you that
while Mary can prove the adultery, h9 still love a her, regrets si ncerely his infidelity and believ·es that if Mary can be prevented from securing a divorce at this
time, he can secure her forg iver~e::~ s and they can,' be reconc:U ed. What ought you to
advise?
,.
(OOMESTIC RELATIONS) I would advi se t hat Mary ca.nnot get a divorce in Virginia until
Feb. 2,1963 as one year's domicile and residence in this state is required for at
l east one of t he pa~ti es to give z. Vir ginia Court juri sdiction . Hence John will
have the time he de sires in which to t r y t o secure a reconcili ati on. See V#20-97.

7 .'Dtohary Dove, the -vlife of Billy Dove, had a yen for an active social life. She
vJas a member of a number of ladies r clubs, and she -Lnsist;.;d upon attending all
social events and dances to which s~G 2.:r1d her husband vJere iavited. Billy Dove
disliked social life and rcf u 3ed t,o accompany his w.Lfe to the parties and dances
to which they Kerz invited, although hr3 did not object to his wife going alone.
While attending a dance , unaccompanied by her husband, Mary met a man named Hope
and they became a ffectionately interested in each othe r and corresponded regularly.
Billy saw soma of these l3tte!'s, v;hich contained V0 l "Y endearing terms and which
aroused his anger. Billy cumplairJed to h-5..s 1-Jife and she assured him she would not
see Hope a gain. A short t i me a fter receiving Maryrs assurances, Mary attended
another dance l-J"ithout her husband. As Hary had not returned home by two o'clock
a.m., Billy went out to Joo~c fo r he r, and found her with Hope, in Hope=s car which
was parked on country club property. When foL:.nd, Mary and Hope were engaged in
what Billy descrihed as a "necking party." Billy refused to permit his \iife to
corn.e bacl~ to his home and live with him. 'l'en d3.ys thereafter Billy Dove filed a
suit for divorce against h'2-s ~rife, chargin~ his wife vr.tth co;1structive desertion,
claiming that his wi f e' s condJ.ct wa:; s uch as to justif;)' h~m in refusing to permit
her to return to his home. 1'1.-:try f iled an ansvrer denying desertion, and she also
~ ;,f.?.· t ~

t ilod a cross-bill charging h~ r husband lvith desertion and praying that she be
gr.J.~-Jted a divorce and ali mony.
Should t he court grant a divorce to either party?
( DOl"'iBSTIC RELA'l'IONS) Yes, Mary is entitled to a divorce for desertion . Billy h<,.cl
no right to refuse to pe:cmit Mary to come back home unless he had grounds for a
chvorce of s ome sort. While Maryi s conduct was indiscreet, it did not amount t o
proof of adultery. Hence Billy has deserted the matrimonial relationship l,Jithout
adequate cause and is himself guilty of constructive desert ion. 161 Va. 786 .
7 f'fn. May, 1962, Wife instituted a suit for divorce a mensa against Husband in tte
Circuit Court of Henry County, alleging by specific dates and circumstances four
separate acts of physical cruelty by Husband which occurred in 1961 and early 1962 _.
culminating in her being compelled, upon the advice of her physician, to leave the: ·
home in February, 1962. At the hearing of the cause, Wife testified as to these
instances of cruelty, which testimony was corroborated in each instance.
Husband then testified that in March,l962, he had asked 1~ife 1 s forgiveness for hit
outbursts of temper, and that she had forgiven him and they had resumed cohabitatia>
in their home. Wife then testified in rebuttal that she had in fact forgiven
Husband, but that in April, 1962, he had become angry with her, without justification, a nd tried to strike her again, but that she had left the home before he could
do so.
Husband argued to the court that Wife was not entitled to a divorce becaus '.
(l)she had condoned his prior conduct by the resumption of cohabitation in March,
and (2)that his conduct after the resumption of cohabitation did not constitute
grounds for divorce.
Are these contentions of Husband sound?
(DOMESTIC RELATIONS) No. C.Qndonation is _conditional on the party in the wrong completely(or at l e ast almost completely) mending his ways. Cruelty is a continuing
matter and i t appears from husband's conduct that he is continuing in his old ways.
'r he condition of the condonation has been violated and it is immaterial that the
wife could not have gotten a divorce for his April misconduct only. See 202 Va.855.

..P~afk

7
and Jill, natives of Richmond, were married there in October, 1960, and
lived together in an apartment in Richmond until Jan.l,l961, when, as a result of a
fuss following a New Year's party, they agreed to separate, she going back to her
parents' home, and he to a hotel.
Jack now consults you as to whether, en the above facts, either is now entitled
to a divorce of any kind. How ought you to advise birr:?
(DOMESTIC RELATIONS) Jack is not entitlect as yet to any· kind of divorce. Separation
by mutual consent is not desertiun.( Note: If the separation continues for three
years then V#20..91(9) would be applicabl(;) .' "On the application of either party if
and when the husband an~ wife have lived ~~parate ana ~part without any cohabitation
and without .interll'U.ption for three years·") See 115 Va, ~17.

•
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Handolph, a resident of Middlesex County, courted Felicity Fox, a widow,
who in 1958 had moved to the county from Michigan. They were married in 1959, at th
county courthouse. Felicity had a three-year old child by her former marriage. She
and her child moved into Rogue's home and were supported by him. In 1960, Felicity
presented Rogue with a son, the result of their union. In the same year, Cleopatra
Carp, an unwed barmaid, gave birth to a child which was conceived out of a clandestine romance between her and Rogue.
In 1961, Felicity learned that Rogue had a
wife living in Maryland and from whom he had never been divorced. She also found ou·
about Rogue's child by Cleopatra. She decided promptly to leave Rogue's home,taking
with her her own child and her child by Rogue. She now asks your advice as to
Hogue's legal responsibility to su.pport(l)her child by her former marriage,(2)her
child by Rogue, and(3)the child born to Cleopatra. How should you advise her?
(DOMESTIC RELATIONS) I should advise her(l)that Rogue owes no duty of support to heJ
child by a former marriage. He is no longer in loco parentis, and, in fact, was
never even her step-father;(2) he does owe a duty to support her child by Rogue because by V#64-7 the children M marriages deemed null at law are nevertheless
legitimate;(3)Rogue owes no legal duty to support his illegitimate child unless he
voluntarily admits under oath or so confesses in court he is the father. See V#206l.l.
3 June 1963.
1 f.~~es Roland filed suit in 1959 against his wife, Eva, in the Circuit Court of
Henry County, Va., seeking a divorce en the grounds of cruelty and desertion. The
wife in her answer denied the a11egations of the bill and filed a cross bill alleging desertion by James and praying for separate maintenance. By decree entered
June 18,1959, James' prayer for divorce was denied and separate maintenance was
awarded Eva. James thereafter left Henry County and became domiciled in Stokes
County, North Carolina, where, after being so domiciled the required period of
time, he commenced a new suit for diverGe. He proceeded by order of publication
against Eva who did not appear or answer the bill. Upon evidence of adultery occur'I'ing subsequent to the Virginia adjudication of 1959, James was awarded a divorce
from Eva. Upon learning of the divorce in North Carolina, Eva instituted a new
suit in the Circuit Court of Henry County, alleged the foregoing facts, and prayed
that a decree be entered affirming her marriage to James. James demurred to the bill
on the following groundu:
(l) The Circuit Court of Henry County was rdthout jurisdiction to affirm a marriage;
and (2)The North Carolina decree was entitled to full faith and credit and as such
binding upon the Circuit Court of Henry County .
Ho1.v should the court rule on each ground?
DOMESTIC RELATIONS)(l) By V#20-·90 either of the arties to a ma__r.ti.ag.e_maz maintain
a s~t.~he same. V//20--96 and 20-98 give jurisdiction to any corporation
or circuit court on the chancery side thereof and the venue is the county or
592.
corporation in which the parties last cohabited. Hence the Circuit Court of Henry
County has jurisdiction.
(2) The Court should rule that under the second Williams Case, Williams v. Nor t h
Carolina, 32S U.S.226, full faith and credit must be given to the North Carolina
c:l.vorce as Roland was bona fide domiciled in North Carolina and the divorce was
valid there. Hence it is binding on the Circuit Court of Hanry County.
Bl~ogue
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2,) £t'iora Durr, in anticipation of divorce proceedings against her husband Will, in

1956 entered into a settlement agreeme~t with him. The agreement provided for the
payment of $hOO per month alimony to Flora beginning Oct. 1, 1956. In the subsequent divorce proceedings the court approved the contract and decreed the monthly
payment of $400 alimony to Flora until such time as she remarried. Payments were
regularly made until Will's death in May of 1963, when such payments were stopped.
Flora now asks you whether the estate of Will Durr may be compelled to continue
paying alimony as directed by the Court's decree until her remarriage.
What ought you to advise her?
(DOMESTIC RELATIONS) The estate of Will Durr is not liable. The agreement between
the parties approved by the Court did not provide for the payment of any sums after
Durr 1 s death but only for the payment of alimony beginning Oct.l,l956. V#20-107
expressly prohibits the Court from decreeing support of children or alimony to
continue after the death of the father or husband. The words "until such time as she
remarried" are surplusage end do not by implication enlarge the duty to pay alimony .
See 195 Va.102 and 204 Va.59. Note: '!'he right to . alimony, as such, ceases on the
death or remarriage of the wife, or on the death of the husband. If there is a valid
contract in lieu of alimony approved by the Court, which clearly provides for payments until the death or remarriage of the wif e even though the husband dies first,
there would then be a duty on the husband's estate to continue the payments.

9.V~l11 Poke and Sally Buck, who were 22 years of age and lived in Alleghany County,
Va . , had been in l ove since childhood. On a moonlit evening i n May of 1957 while
walking t o the top of a nearby hill, Bi ll and Sally decided they should become man
and wife, whereupon they exchanged vows, and declared themselves married f or better
or for worse. They then commenc ed living in Alleghru1y County as husband and wife .
Approxi mately one year l a ter they had a son whom they named Pe te Poke . Bill was
prone to brag to any one who was willing to lis ten t hat his child little Pete wa s a
ttchip off the old block." In July of 1963 Bill l eu.rned t hat bis Uncle Mike Poke
had accumulated consider able mon8y, and wished Bill t o come and live with him in
the City of Richmond. Being by that t ime unhappy i n Alleghany County, and having
lost his affection for Sally, Bi l l wi thout info rming Sally l eft at once fo r Richmond
where he set up r es idence with his uncl e Hike .
Sally has now brought a s ui t agains t Bill in t he Law and Equi ty Court of t b.e City
of Richmond in which she alleged his des ertion and pr ays that an order be entered
(a )requi ring that Bill pay he:r each month a r easonable sum of money fo r her s upport
and rr.:: l ntenance, and (b) r equirir.g t hat Bi ll provi de e&ch mont h a r easonable sum of
money f or the support and maintenance of little Pete . I s she ent i t led to the
relief sought?
(DOMESTIC HELATIONS) (a ) Sally is not ent itl ed to this relief for her sel f s ince a
common l a>v marr iage i s voi d i n Vi r ginia . (b) Either, (l )she is entitl ed t o t he support
money for Pet e because by V#64-7 t he issue of marri&ges deemed null i n l aw ar e . . ."'
nevertheless l egitimat e, and hence are entit l ed to all t he rights of l egitimate \.•'
childr en; or(2) she is not enti t led to support money becaus e the bas t ardy act,
V#20-6l.l, a llows support money to childr en whose parents ar e not marr ied only if
the f ather admits pat er nity before a court having j urisdi ction t o t r y such a case,
or voluntari ly admits pater nit y, i n wri t i ng under oath. Since the parents were not
married and there was no admiss i on of pat erni ty in v~iting under oath, the father i s
not l i able for Pete's support.

•

•

•
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Sally Smith consults you, advising that she and her husband, have without inter ...
ruption, lived separate and a.part and ;-rithout any cohabitation for four years. She
inquires whether she is entitled to a divorce in Virginiia. Upon inquiry you find
that at the time of the separation; and at the time Sally consults you, both she and
her husband were residents of and domiciled in the State of Virginia. You also learn
from Sally that she has no com;;laints about the manner in which her husband has
treated her and that the pa.rties separated by agreement because of incompatibility.
How should yoll advise Sa.lly?
(DOMESTIC RELATIONS) Sally is entitled to a divorce. V#20-91 reads in part: "A
divorce from the band of matrimony may be decreed:(9) On the application of either
party if and whan the husband and wife have lived separate and apart without any
cohabitation and without interruption for t1--10 years.'1
3 J>L~ring the courtchip of Henry and w~nda, the latter was injured in an automobile
accident because of the gross negligence of He~ry while driving Wanda's automobile,
which wo.s also slightly damaged in the accident. This did not dampen their ardor
f or one another, and t hey were married within four months of this accident. During
the second month of marriage they had an argument, and in leaving the house, Henry
negligently backed his automobile i nto Wanda's same automobile, extensively damaging the same and injuring vJanda, v.rho was sitting in her automobile. Two weeks later
they reconciled, but Wanda consulted a lawyer within a month of the second accident
in regard to bringing an a ction against Henry for damages for-(1) the personal injuri e~: custainecl before marriage.
(2) the damage to her automobile sustained before and after marriage , and
(3) the personal injuries sustained after marrlago.
What should the lm.;ryer advise af. to her leg<J.l rights in regard to the three ~laima?
(DOMESTIC RELATIONS)(l) She has no claim here, as a wife in Virginia cannot sue her
husband for a persoml tort. V//55-36( the Married Women 1 s Ac t)does not change the
common law on this point. It is jjnmaterial that the porsoDal injury occurred before the marriage or that her husband carr ied liability insurance . See 193 Va.727
on p.l217 of the Domestic Relations Case8 in these Notes. (2) She can recover
damages for injury to her property either before or aft.er the rr.f:l.rriage as the
Married Women's Act recognizes and protects her property rights. See 197 Va ., 216 on
p.l222 of the Domestic Reiaati ons Cases i n these Notes" (3) No, fo r the same reason
as given in (1) above.

'5.. 6
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8. John and Jane were marri ed and lived in Albemarle County, Va. John was off ered a

•

much better position in Davis Coun:i:,y J Va. , 1vhioh he accepted over the protest of
Jane, who liked Albemarle and ~riolently disliked D.:w:i.s Cou~ty . John persuaded Jane
to come to Davis County and try living in the house he h9.d bought there. She trie1
liv·ing with John in Davis CountJy, but after three monthD she left a note to John
reading: "I have tried li"Ting here but I don't like it. The people aren't educ~ted
the place is remote from anywhere, all my friends live in Albemarle and I am going 1
back there • If you ;-;ant to continue living with me you will be welcome in Albemarle.
Goodbye ." John w~ote numerous letters begging her to re turn t o his home in Davis
County but she was adamant in her refucal.
Jane now. cons~l ts ~o~ te~ling ~ou that she came back to Albemarle <Tanuary 2, 1964,
that John 1s st1ll llv1ng 1n Dav1s County, that shcl hasn 1 t seen him since her return
to Albemarle, that he hasn 't supported her, and that she wants a divorce and
alimony~ She asks you (a ) in Hhat court she can bring a suit against John for these
purposes; and (b) on the above facts can she ~vin?
(DONESTIC RELATIONS) (a) Since the parties l ast cohabited in D:wis County and since
defendant resides in Davis County the sui t f or di vorca "JO Llld have to be b:=-ought in
Davis County in the Ci rcuit Court thereof . See Vf/20- 9e. . (b) She is not yet entitled
to a divorce. She has deserted her husband as she was und el' a marital duty to live
with him. He cannot be required to support her else-vib8re as long as his choice of
a home is reasonable. Sinc 9 t hey have not yet lived separately and a,part for two
years V#20-91(9) is not appHcabl e. 1.1 1 '· J
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4 P 'lli.an,who had a modest income from her father's estate, bought on credit in 19Sk
a $5,000 trousseau before he~ wedding to John, a young business man of moderate
means. Shortly after they reJwrned from a brief weddiug trip she became provoked
with him and said, "I will teach y0u a lesson, you old tightwad .n She then bought
and had charged to her husband a new Cadillg.e' sedan. John had at that time a new
Buick which was used as a family automobile and which was generally available for
her use. As further evidence of her desire to teach him a lesson, she declined to
pay for her trousseau and the Cadillac.
The sellers of the trousseau and Cadillac have threatened to sue John. He consu~3~J
you as to whether or not he has a defense with respect to:(a) The cost of the
trousseau, and (b) the cos~ of the Cadillac.
How would you advise him with respect to both accounts?
(DOMESTIC RELATIONS)(a) John is not. liable for the bill for the trousseau as a
husband is no longer liable for his wife's ante~ nuptial contracts. (b) Nor is ,J"c,:.r-:
1
liable for the Cadillac as a se'Jond car was not a necessity in view of John's
station
in
life
at
that
time.
,/
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5. -Mary sued James for an absolute divorce on the ground th<>,·::, they had lived

separate and apart without any cohe>.bitation and without interruption fo:::- two y a: ~a,
but she sought no alimony. He filed a plea in uhich he alleged t:1at sh;3 was ; 1,8t
entitled to a divorce because she was guilty of adultery.
Assuming that both parties prove the all~gations of their respective pleadings,
which were in proper form, how should the Chancellor rule on the matter?
(DOMESTIC RELATIONS) The Chancellor should grant the divorce. Under the present.
Virginia statute V#20-91(9) either party is entitl~d to a divorce if they have net
lived together for a period of two years free from the defenses of res adjudicata
and recrimination.

3~~

March of 1963, Ann Hardy obtained a final divorce from her husband Karl Hardy
c· cuit Court of Albemarle County on the ground of desertion occurring more
than ~ne J.r ear before. At the time the divorce was granted, Ann being well provided
for by in~ependent means, the decree made no award to her of alimony. However, the
decree did provide that Betsy, the six year old daughter of the parties~ should be
in the custody of her mother Ann from each September through the folloW1ng June,
and should be in the custody of her father Karl each July and August. The decree of
divorce concluded with the following language:
"Nothing further remaining to be done in this cause, it is stricken from
the docket and the Clerk is directed to file the papers herein among
those for ended causes."
Ann Hardp, who has never remarried, now consults you and advises that ~hrough poor
investments she has lost virtually all her property, and also informs you that Karl
Hardy has become heavily addicted to intoxicants and is a bad influenc~ on her
daughter Betsy when the latter is in his custody. She asks your opinion on whether,
i f she can prove the foregoing facts, she can now proceed against Karl Hardy in the
Circuit Court of Albemarle County and obt~in an order(a)requiring Karl to pay her a
reasonable sum for alimony, and (b) awarding her sole custody of Betsy.
How would you advise her?
(FAMILY LAW)(a) Ann not entitled to alimony because decree made no award Whatever
and thus alimony matter concluded by decree. Perry, 202 Va.849. (b) Va.Code 20-108
expressly gives the court continuing jurisdiction to change or modify its decree as
to the custody and maintenance of minor children. Upon a showing that due to the
changed circumstances it will be to the child's best interests to be in the sole
custody of the mother the court will enter its decree to that effect.
1n th
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J ane Crow was deserted by h er husb and, John Crow~ Shortly after
tho de s ertion they on torod into ~a .. contract settling thei r property
rights and providing for tho support and maintenance of Jane. Tho contract called for tho payment of $400 per month for tho support and
maintenance of Juno as long as she lived or until sho remarried, and it
specifically stntcd.
1
i 'rhis contract shall continuo in full force
and effect after the death of John Crow, and
shall be bindine upon his estate, it being tho
intent of tho parties that tho estate of John
Crow shall be obligated by the norms of this
contract to continuo tho payments heroin
provided for tho support and mintenance of
Jane Crow"
A year after tho co~ro.ct wo.s entered into John Crow diod, and Jane,
who had not remarried, cnllod upon tho o:;wcutor of his osta.to to
continuo tho p o.ymvn t s provided for in tho contrnct. 'l'hc executor consults you o.nd inquires whether tho ost nte of John Crow is obli untod
to continuo tho payments called f@r b;t tho contract. what would you
advise?
You should advise tho executor thD.t John's Estate is obligo.tod to c ontinuo tho po.ymonts called for by tho cart; ract. The contr.2ct provisions
providing for payments to continuo after John's d oo. th .2re v.2 lid and
binding upon tho estate, and tho courts will uphold such agreements as
long as they arc just and rcasono.blo.
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Wrerm suod hor husb.2nd, John \vr onn , in tho Cir0ui t Court
of' Augusto. County, Virginia, for divorce, o.limony and support for tho
inl'o.nt twin do.ught ors born uf t ll-..: mo.rrio.go. Tho husbo.nd vigorously
dc.t'endod tho suit but tho tri al court ontcrod a ducrco on tho 8th do.y
of JLliluo.ry, 1966, granting 1\b bol a divorce on tho ground of adul t e ry~
'rho docro o o.wnrd....:d f'lo.bul alimony in the sum of :rJOO per month, o.nd o.
c..vncrd od support for tho twin daughters in th o amount of $200 por
l11onth. 'I'ho dogr ou further provided:
11
'rho p rovis ion here in for .2li.mony shall continuo
o.ftcr the d oc.t th of John Wrenn o.nd so long ns
l''lo.bol Wronn docs no t remarry; .::md tlD pro vi sio n
huroin for thu support of' the children shall
continuo o.ftGr tho duath of John Wrenn o.nd
until tho children ren.ch tho .'lgo of 211 yo et rs, ,;
J ohn Wrenn died on Ivla.y 1 1966, o.nd Habel Wrenn ma do do.l:la.o.nd upon tho
ox"cutor of his osta.te 'L~ continuo the payments of 8liinonJ .::md support
for tho children. 'rho e.t~ v cl.ltor consults you .::md inquires whether tho
0 :::.: t ~t te of John Wrenn will havo to continuo tho po.yrnon t_n p r ovidoC\
fol" in the dccroo. Wha t WOLlld you o.dviso? (Dt>--t.-.1-:-.._
~I#~~
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'l'ho court has no authority to enter such a decree. Section 20-1 O'j

or tho Code, holds that a court of Chancery in Vir gi nia in entering n
decree for a divorce a vinculo matrimoni has no power, in tlro absunce
of any agreement b etween the part1es, to extend a limony pD.ymc.nts beyond tho dEJath of tho husband. A 195L~ mmnondmon t now l;rovidcs that tho
court 0hall also havo no authority to decree support of chil:l ron to
continuo after the death of the father.
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6$ Alma married Ben in 1959 in Lynchburg, Va., where they continued to reside. In
1960, Ben disappeared and Alma heard nothing from him, and in 1964 saw a newspaper
report that Ben had been killed in an automobile accident in West Virginia. She had
been keeping company with Cal and married him in 1965, the license being obtained
and ceremony performed in Harrisonburg, Va. They resided in Harrisonburg for six
months, whereupon Cal deserted Alma without cause and his whereabouts remained unknown. Alma then learned that Ben was, i~faet, alive and had obtained a valid
divorce from her in Lynchburg, Va., in 1966. In 1967, Alma married Douglas in
Lexington, Va., but three months later, having ample evidence to support her allegation, she brought a suit against him for divorce from the bonds of matrimony, and
seeking alimony on the ground of adulterous conduct by Douglas. Douglas filed a
cross-bill alleging that his marriage to Alma was void and of no effect in that it
was bigamous and, therefore, Alma could have no rights thereunder to a decree of
divorce or alimony. How should the court rule?
(DOMESTIC RELATIONS) Judgment for Alma. Douglas marriage to her was not bigamous or
void. The real bigamous marriage occurred in 1965 when Alma married Cal. At that
time the marriage to Ben was still in effect, thus the marriage to Cal was void
ab initio. However, Ben's valid divorce decree in 1966 freed Alma to marry Douglas
in 1967. Va.Code 20-41,20-42,20-43, 173 Va.425.
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